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. MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

COURTS-JURISDICTION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE ESTABLISHING
JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT CONDUCTING BusINEss IN STATE THROUGH
RESIDENT AGENT-Defendant, a resident of Utah, sued petitioner, a resident of
California, to recover construction costs and contractor's fee for the erection of a
building at petitioner's Utah place of business. In accordance with a statute of
Utah 1 providing that jurisdiction over a nonresident individual doing business in
the state could be obtained in all actions arising out of the conduct of the business
by serving process on the resident agent managing the business, summons was
served on the petitioner's Utah manager. Petitioner appeared specially and moved
to quash the summons for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied. He
then obtained an alternative writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Utah
to stop proceedings in the district court. On an order to show cause why the
alternative writ should not be made permanent, held, the writ should be recalled.
The statute did not deny due process; the question of retroactive application was
not raised because there was sufficient business activity subsequent to its effective
date. Wein v. Crockett, (Utah I948) I95 P. (2d) 222.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim against an individual rests on more than
the power of the state to enforce the judgments of its courts. It exists when there
is: (I) a relationship between the state and the individual by virtue of which
the enforcement of a judgment can be said to be reasonable, and ( 2) notice to
the individual with an opportunity to defend.2 "Reasonableness" once required
actual physical presence of the individual. 8 But juristic theory has gradually

Utah Laws (1947) c. IO.
Sunderland, "The Problem of Jurisdiction," 4 True. L.
BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 42.2 (1935).
8 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 at 734 (1877).
1

2

REV.

429 (1926);

I

RECENT DECISIONS

2 79

attenuated presence as a basis by conceding that consent 4 and domicile 5 are alone
sufficient affiliating circumstances to support jurisdiction.6 Is the conduct of an
ordinary business an additional basis on which the courts of the state can rest
jurisdiction over the nonresident individual without denying him rights assured
by due process? The Supreme Court's original answer was in the negative, on
the theory that a state could not attach a condition of consent to jurisdiction to the
exercise of a privilege guaranteed by the Constitution.7 Subsequently, however,
the Court found it a reasonable exercise of the police power to make the conduct
of a business the basis of jurisdiction.8 But, since this conclusion was reached with
respect to a busines subjected by the state to special regulation, it is not precise
authority for the proposition that the conduct of ordinary business is a sufficiently
reasonable basis. 9 Despite the absence of exact authority, the treatment of analogous statutes indicates that the Utah court has reached the proper result. The
finding that the act of driving a motor vehicle is a reasonable circumstance to
which to attach jurisdiction has settled the validity of the statutes subjecting the
nonresident motorist to the jurisdiction of the local courts in causes of action
arising from the doing of that act.10 It has likewise been held reasonable for the
state to impose its jurisdiction on foreign corporations on the basis of conduct of
business within the state though the only business so conducted is in the channels
of interstate commerce.11 Finally, mere ownership or use of land has been found
4

Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 58 S.Ct. 454 (1938); Gilbert v. Burnstine,
255 N.Y. 348, 174N.E. 706 (1931); see 89A.L.R. 1503 (1934).
5
Milliken v. Meyer, 3n U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339 (1940); 132 A.L.R. 1361
(1941).
6
If jurisdiction can be asserted when the individual is outside the state, service must
necessarily be by some substitute method. The due process requisites of substitute service
have been established by the nonresident motorist cases. 96 A.L.R. 594 (1935). It was
found in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553 (1935), that service
on the agent in a manner similar to that provided by the Utah statute involved in the
principal case satisfies these requisites.
7
Flexner v. Farson; 248 U.S. 289, 39 S.Ct. 97 (1918).
8
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553 (1935); see Stoner v.
Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 A. 527 (1934).
9
However, the Restatement of Judgments, on the authority of the Doherty case,
seems to reach the broad conclusion that an ordinary business may validly afford the basis
of jurisdiction. JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT,§ 22 (1942).
Viewed in conjunction with International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579, 34 S.Ct. 944 (1914) (see note II, infra), the limiting effect of Flexner v. Farson,
248 U.S. 289, 39 S.Ct. 87 (1918), may be less than the language of that case would
indicate. It is also significant that the court in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623, 54S.Ct. 553 (1935), distinguished Flexner v. Farson on a fact basis which had been
passed over in the case itself, indicating that it may no longer consider it valid authority
for the conclusion that a statute like that in question is invalid.
10
99 A.L.R. 130 (1935); 1 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 84.2 (1935).
11
lnternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944 (1914);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). This
analogy is particularly pertinent, for the corporation engaged only in interstate commerce
is in substantially the same position with resp~ct to state regulation by virtue of the
commerce clause, U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, as is the individual by virtue of the interstate
privileges and immunities clause, U.S. Const.; Art. 4, § 2. Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164 (1941).
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to be a sufficient affiliating circumstance to permit the state to assert personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident owner or occupant in causes of action arising out
of the use of the land.12 Since these acts of the individual and the conduct of ordinary business by the corporation engaged in interstate commerce are reasonable
bases for jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how it can be found that the conduct of
ordinary business by the individual is not. That this is a reasonable basis for
jurisdiction is indicated by the prevalence of its treatment as such abroad.18
Inasmuch as the purpose of a statute like that involved in the principal case is to
give more adequate protection to citizens by enabling them to sue in conveniently
located courts, it would seem to be in furtherance of that principle to refuse to
recognize a limitation that the business conducted must be one subject to special
regulation.
Davi,d D. Ring

12 Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D ..& C. 61 (1938), noted in 87 UNiv. PA.
L. REV. 119 (1938). See Pa. Ann. Stat. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) § 331.
18 Beale, "The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners," 26 HARV. L. REv. 193,
202, 203 (1913); Sunderland, "The Problem of Jurisdiction," 4 TEX. L. REV. 429
(1926).

